![]() University of Southern California Professor Jonathan Markowitz empirically demonstrates the link between the power projection of the Russian military force and territorial negotiations with Norway. While Professor David Sobek of LSU demonstrates that most modern asymmetric dyadic relations merely involve economic and diplomatic coercion, Russia is a European outlier in its embrace of military coercion. Though Moscow will criticize other countries for not complying with treaty requirements, Russia’s core interests are weakly protected by the Spitzbergen Treaty, making asymmetric bilateral negotiations with Oslo the most appealing path to Moscow. Similarly, the Svalbard narrative centers on Moscow’s perceived unfair exclusion from the 1920 Spitzbergen Treaty which has led to mistreatment of the 10-20% of ethnic Russians who make up Svalbard’s population. Even more recently in Ukraine, the Kremlin demonstrated its willingness to use force to achieve political goals based upon alternative historical interpretations. Righting alleged historical wrongs, which placed ethnic Russians outside of the Russian state, underpinned both the 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. In the modern era, the Russian state bolsters irredentist claims with historical narratives to legitimize violations of sovereignty. He famously stated that the treaty should be “thrown in the trash and that Bear Island unequivocally belonged to Russia.” While they signed the treaty in 1935, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov made his objections clear. Thus, Oslo was able to persuade the allied delegation to grant Norway sovereignty over Svalbard and Bear Island (the southernmost island of Svalbard) with the concession of maritime activities to any of the signatories. Moscow did not partake in the Paris treaty negotiations because of the ongoing civil-war and early exit from WWI resulting in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In addition to the strategic utility of Svalbard, there is much historical baggage stemming from the 1920 Spitzbergen treaty, which provides Norway with its shaky claim to sovereignty over the archipelago. Russia views the Spitzbergen Treaty as illegitimate Svalbard’s potential as a reconnaissance and surveillance post nullifies Naguroyske’s attractiveness as a forward staging base and ballistic missile hub. Russia’s northernmost military base, Nagurskoye Airbase lies only 260 km west of Svalbard. ![]() Svalbard also presents a threat to Russian missile and air operations in the High North. Besides the GIUK Gap, a Norwegian/NATO-controlled Svalbard Archipelago is the largest hindrance to Russia’s Northern fleet operations, and by extension its Atlantic naval power projection. Thus, Murmansk remains the only large warm water port with direct access to the Atlantic Ocean (albeit through the GIUK Gap). Moreover, it is limited by the Montreux Convention which restricts nuclear submarine operations in the Black Sea. ![]() The Baltic Sea Fleet remains severely limited by the Danish Straits chokepoint and the Black Sea Fleet faces at least two choke points to reach the Atlantic. Murmansk is doubly vital as a nuclear submarine port with access to the Atlantic. Murmansk is home to Russia’s largest fleet and some of its most advanced infantry and air contingents. Source: Russian geostrategic concerns remain at odds with Norwegian controlled Svalbard While the newly revealed oil and gas reserves around Svalbard complicate Oslo-Moscow relations, the geopolitical underpinnings largely remain under-examined in the media.įigure 1: Svalbard’s position in the Barents Sea However, as the Arctic continues to thaw at an increasing rate, Svalbard is quickly becoming a region of lasting geopolitical importance. Recently, there has been extensive reporting on Svalbard’s new oil and gas stores and the Barents sea more broadly, but little on potential geostrategic issues. This landmass is perhaps best known for its “doomsday seed vault” or the fact that it has more polar bears than people. Svalbard is an archipelago the size of Croatia located approximately 1000 km due north of Tromsø, Norway and roughly 1000 km northwest of Murmansk, Russia. The unique provisions of the Treaty of Svalbard, NATO ambiguity on the status of Svalbard, and mounting geopolitical tensions between Russia and Norway signify a realistic probability of outright violation of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard in the medium to long-term. ![]() Source: “ High Arctic protection” by Neil.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |